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SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT OF 1974-HISTORY AND 
CRITIQUE 
Thomas J. Douglas* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the American public has generally assumed that 
their drinking water was healthy and safe.· As one commentator 
noted, "[o]verconfidence or apathy seems to pervade the public's 
attitude with respect to drinking water. Common daily experience 
plus a current myth about the future, falsely implies that the qual-
ity, safety, and adequacy of our municipal water supply systems are 
above reproach. Perhaps the myth can be stated as follows: 
'[e]veryone knows we have launched a massive water pollution 
control effort and that waterborne disease outbreaks are a thing of 
the past.'''2 However, by 1974 such assumptions and myths con-
cerning the safety of America's drinking water were being seriously 
challenged. 
The Community Water Supply Study, a comprehensive study 
undertaken by the Bureau of Water Hygiene of the Public Health 
Service, reported serious deficiencies in the quality of drinking 
water being delivered and the ability of treatment plants to effec-
tively purify drinking water.3 A report from the Comptroller General 
* Staff member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6457 (1974). The House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce noted that: "Until relatively recently the fundamental 
elements of life-clean air to breathe, safe water to drink-have been taken for granted in 
the United States." 
2 SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT OF 1973, S. REP. No. 231, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973). Testimony of Jay Lehr of the National Water Wells Association. 
Expressing a similar but more direct explanation for the public's attitude, Ralph Nader 
stated that: "[T]he basic psychological attitude of the public toward drinking water seems 
to be that if it doesn't pinch, it doesn't hurt." Hearings on S. 1735 Before the Subcomm. on 
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1973). 
3 BUREAU OF WATER HYGIENE, UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEW, COMMUNITY 
WATER SUPPLY STUDy-ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY FiNDINGS (1970) (hereinafter cited as the 
CWSS). The CWSS will be discussed in detail, infra, in text at notes 38·47. 
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in 1973 indicated that a survey of public water systems in six states 
had uncovered similar water quality and treatment plant deficien-
cies. 4 Furthermore, evidence introduced at Congressional hearings 
indicated that approximately 130 outbreaks of waterborne diseases 
were reported during the 1960's." Notwithstanding the general pub-
lic belief that drinking water was safe, these reports indicated some-
thing had to be done to ensure that America's drinking water ac-
tually was safe. After four years of hearings and debates, the Con-
gress of the United States decided that major federal involvement 
was warranted, passing legislation known as the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA) which was signed into law by President Ford on 
December 16, 1974.6 
During the history of public water systems in America, which 
spans the period from the colonial era to the present day, communi-
ties encountered numerous problems concerning their public drink-
ing water supplies. Historically, state and local governments had 
taken primary responsibility in dealing with these problems. By the 
1930's these governments had overcome the gravest problem: the 
waterborne diseases which ravaged America during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. Other problems remained, how-
ever, and coupled with new problems which arose during the 1950's 
and 1960's, the federal government clearly had to assume a leading 
role in assuring that the drinking water supplied to American con-
sumers would be healthy and safe. This article will examine the 
problems which provided the incentive for increased federal involve-
ment in public water systems, culminating in the enactment of the 
SDW A. The new role the Act provides for the Federal government 
as the assuror of safe drinking water will also be examined. 
I. PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS IN AMERICA 
The SDWA defines "a public water system" as "a system for the 
provision to the public of piped water for human consump-
tion .... "7 Such systems, however, did not provide drinking water 
• COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, IMPROVED FEDERAL AND STATE PRO-
GRAMS NEt;DED TO INSURE THE PURITY AND SAFETY OF DRINKING WATER IN THE UNITED STATE;S 
(19nl. 
" UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6457 (1974). In addition Representative 
Robison noted that, "[mlost experts agree that other such outbreaks have not been reported 
because of fear of political or legal liability, or simply because of local pride." 120 CONGo REC. 
10,798 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974). 
• 5 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1297 (1974). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (Supp. IV, 1974). "Public" only refers to who is served by the system, 
not who owns it. See, infra note 12. 
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to many Colonial Americans: "In the main, shallow wells, surface 
water and cisterns for rain catchment provided drinking water sup-
plies."8 In about 1750, a Pennsylvania village became the first com-
munity to receive its water from a public system. Water from a local 
spring was piped down the main street of the village.9 In 1799, a 
small section of Philadelphia began to receive its water in wooden 
pipes from the Schuylkill River.1O Thereafter the number of public 
water systems grew rapidly. Beginning with fewer than 16 systems 
in 1800, there were 400 public systems serving the towns and cities 
of America by 1860. 11 There were more than 3,000 systems by 1900 
and presently there are more than 40,000 public systems. 12 
When the early water systems were developed, attention was 
given to the convenient distribution of water. Little concern was 
expressed for the water system's ability to transmit germs and dis-
ease. 13 Nor was the progress of science in the early nineteenth cen-
tury of any significant assistance in providing protection from the 
hazards of drinking water. Even though primitive chemical anaysis 
of drinking water was possible, the health effects of substances in 
the water supply were unknown}· Notwithstanding the paucity of 
scientific knowledge concerning drinking water safety, communities 
began to take action. Beginning in the early 1800's cities passed laws 
to prevent the dumping of foreign matter into their water supplies. IS 
This local action, however, was not able to adequately protect 
Americans from the ravages of waterborne diseases. From 1861 to 
1870, the national death rate from typhoid fever averaged close to 
120 per 100,000 population.16 This epidemic, especially in the grow-
• L. DWORSKY, WATER & AIR POLLUTION 7 (1971). 
• Id. at 7. 
,. Id. at 8. See a/so, N. BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CITIES (1956), for a history ofthe development 
of early public water systems in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. 
" L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 8. 
12 Harris and Brecher, Is the Water Safe To Drink?, 39 CONS. REpORTS 436 (1974). Of the 
40,000 public water systems, Henry Patterson of the National Water Works Conference noted 
that approximately 5,500 are owned by private investors while the rest are run by public 
authorities. Hearings on H.R. 1093, H.R. 5454, and H.R. 437 Before the Subcomm. on Public 
Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1971). 
13 N. BLAKE, supra, note 10 at 248. See a/so, L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 8, which notes 
that piped water provided an "efficient" means of delivering hazardous bacteria. 
" N. BLAKE, supra note 10, at 248. Blake noted that in Boston at that time it was argued 
that water which had small animal life in it was surely safe, for otherwise the frail creatures 
would not'survive. 
" Id. at 256. 
" L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
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ing cities, combined with bacteriological information from Euro-
pean scientists, led to the formation of state boards of health. 17 Until 
new water treatment technologies were developed, however, these 
boards could not effectively combat waterborne diseases. 18 The ini-
tial breakthrough in the mid-1870's was the development of slow-
sand filtration of water supplies. Rapid-sand filtration followed in 
the mid-1880's.19 An indication of how effective these new technolo-
gies were is that the national typhoid fever death rate, which from 
1861 to 1870 had adveraged 120 per 100,000 population, was lowered 
to under 10 per 100,000 by 1918.20 
The initial federal action concerning drinking water was the es-
tablishment of the Public Health Service Hygienic Laboratory in 
1901.21 The laboratory was to investigate infectious and contagious 
diseases. In 1912, the Public Health Service (PHS) received author-
ity to investigate "the diseases of man and conditions influencing 
the propogation and spread thereof, including sanitation and se-
wage .... "22 In 1914, the PHS took its first major step with the 
promulgation of the Drinking Water Standards (DWS). The DWS 
established criteria to test drinking water which was to be used by 
interstate carriers. If a water supply did not meet the DWS criteria, 
it could not be used by interstate carriers. 23 In 1925, the standards 
were revised after a finding that they were being used to determine 
the quality of water being distributed by municipalities and that 
they were also being used in courts "as the legal standard for the 
purity of water."24 The DWS experienced further revision in 1946 
and 1962.25 
17 [d. at 9. Massachusetts established the first board of health in 1869. Hearings on H.R. 
1093. supra note 12, at 607. 
" Hearings on H.R. 1093. supra note 12, at 607. 
" L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
211 [d. 
21 [d. at 11. Act of March 3, 1901, ch. 853, 31 Stat. 1137. 
" L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 8-9. Act of August 14, 1912, ch. 288, 37 Stat. 309. 
23 The DWS were adopted as an aid to the Public Health Service's administration of the 
Interstate Quarantine Regulations. Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 611. The author-
ity to establish and revise drinking water standards for interstate carriers was vested in the 
United States Public Health Service until 1970. In 1970 that authority was transferred to the 
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. UNITED STATES CODE 
CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6456 (1974). 
" L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 16. Because the DWS were being used in a greater number 
of important situations than had been anticipated, it was apparently decided that they 
should be upgraded. 
" Hearings on H.R. 1093. supra note 12, at 612. 
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One commentator has argued that". . . [l]argely as a result of 
using these [PHS] standards as guides, the safety of [America's] 
drinking water supplies is one of the unique public health engineer-
ing feats of the world. 26 In 1971, prior to the enactment of the 
SDWA, they had been officially adopted or used by a large number 
of states as the criteria for determining the safety of their drinking 
water.27 The DWS have certainly contributed to the safety of Ameri-
can drinking water; however as a policy tool, the DWS had certain 
limitations. The federal enforcement authority was limited to pro-
hibiting interstate carriers from using water from a system which 
failed to comply with the DWS.28 The federal government had no 
authority to take action to correct problems which existed, nor could 
it restrict the use of the non-complying system by communities 
being served by it.29 In addition the DWS have been further criti-
cized because of the limited number of contaminants they set cri-
teria for.30 Aspects of these criticisms will be given further considera-
tion in the analysis of the Congressional activity preceding the 
SDWA.31 
Through the application of technological developments and the 
combined efforts of the state and federal governments, the incidence 
of waterborne disease was virtually eliminated by the 1930'sY As a 
result of this successful effort against waterborne diseases, the na-
tional concern with drinking water safety apparently decreased. 
With the inception of the federal water pollution program in 1948, 
drinking water safety was given even lower priority.33 As a result of 
" L. DWORSKY, supra note 8, at 16. 
27 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 340. Testimony of John Vogt of the Conference 
of State Sanitary Engineers. 
" SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 69. At the same hearings Robert Fri of 
the EPA noted that the limited enforcement authority only applied to 650 out of approxi-
mately 30,000 public water systems. [d. at 105. 
'" [d. at 69. 
30 Hearings on S. 1478 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 
(1972). Ralph Nader stated that: 
The DWS is now being revised and for good reason. It is incomplete in major areas of 
known contamination. It does not provide for any standards relating to mercury and other 
heavy metals, sodium, pesticides, [and] herbicides, ... to name a few areas. [U]sing 
the present DWS as the evaluative measure [for water quality] has to represent the most 
minimum approach. 
31 See, infra, text at notes 58-61. 
32 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 61. 
33 The basis for this diminished priority seemed to be what Charles Johnson termed, ". 
the popular misconception that water pollution control efforts are a panacea which will . 
guarantee delivery of healthful quantities of safe drinking water .... " Hearings on H.R. 
1093, supra note 12, at 62. 
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this increased concern with water pollution and decreased concern 
with drinking water safety, state programs to ensure safe drinking 
water suffered.34 
While public concern and governmental action were diminishing, 
the technological change and economic growth following World War 
II led to the introduction of many new chemical pollutants into the 
water supplies.3s Water supply treatment technology, however, was 
not advancing rapidly enough to solve many of these new problems: 
[A]s industry developed, we developed more sophisticated chemicals 
while normal drinking water treatment technologies stayed essentially 
the same. As a result, our ability to absorb new shocks, to meet new 
problems affecting the Nation's drinking water supplies, became less.341 
When statistics from the 1960's indicated that waterborne diseases 
still had to be reckoned with in America, national concern with the 
safety of America's drinking water re-emerged. The statistics indi-
cated that during the 1960's approximately 130 outbreaks of water-
borne diseases had been reported. 37 
In response to the re-emergence of concern with drinking water, 
the Bureau of Water Hygiene of the PHS in 1969 undertook a study 
of 969 public water supply systems in order to determine how effec-
tive the systems were in providing safe water to the American pub-
lic. The findings of the PHS were published in the Community 
Water Supply Study (CWSS), which was designed to assess: the 
status of drinking water quality, water supply systems facilities, and 
bacteriological surveillance programs in urban and suburban 
areas. 38 The results of the CWSS indicated that deficiencies existed 
3< Hearings on S. 1478, supra note 30, at 170. Charles Johnson of the American Public 
Health Association stated that: 
Up to the forties we had good water supply programs at the state level. As the water 
pollution control monies became available, as the pressure became apparent that they 
[the states] had to do something in this field [water pollution], they took their trained 
manpower, [and] moved it to where the gold was ... and they produced a water pollu-
tion control effort at the expense of a water supply effort. 
:I' Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 61l. 
30 [d. at 598. Testimony of Leonard Dworsky, Director, Water Resources and Marine Sci-
ences Center, Cornell University. 
37 UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6457 (1974). Among the more noteworthy 
outbreaks were a gastroenteritis attack affecting 18,000 residents of Riverside, California in 
1965; a gastroenteritis attack affecting 30% of the community of Angola, N.Y. in 1968; and 
hepatitis striking the Holy Cross football team in 1969. 
3' BUREAU OF WATER HYGIENE, supra note 3, at i. Drinking water quality was measured 
against the DWS and water was found to have either not violated any standard, violated a 
recommended constituent limit, or violated a mandatory limit. [d. at 12. Plant and facilities 
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not only in the quality of water being delivered to the American 
consumer but also in the capacities of the purifying and distribution 
systems. It also indicated deficiencies in the surveillance of the 
systems by state and local officials. 
Of the 969 systems studied, only 59 per cent were delivering water 
that satisfied the DWS.39 In 25 per cent of the systems, water was 
delivered that exceeded at least one of the DWS recommended lim-
its. In 16 percent of the sytems, water was delivered that exceeded 
one or more of the DWS mandatory contaminant limits.40 The study 
also found that 56 per cent of the water treatment facilities had a 
major physical deficiency.41 Further, in 54 per cent of the sytems no 
ordinances existed which would prevent cross-connection between 
drinking water and sewage lines. 42 Another common deficiency was 
the lack of training of those responsible for the operation of water 
treatment facilities. Approximately two thirds of the operators 
lacked any special water technology training, and were also defi-
cient in microbiological and chemistry training. 43 The CWSS also 
found inadequacies in the administration of water system surveil-
lance programs. An insufficient number of samples had been taken 
in more than one of the 12 months prior to the study in 85 per cent 
of the systems surveyed.44 
As a result of these findings, the PHS made a number of explicit 
and implicit recommendations in the CWSS. The study noted that 
many of the DWS had been established with insufficient data on 
health effects of contaminants in the water. It also noted that many 
contaminants in drinking water, such as mercury, were not covered 
were judged to be free from major deficiency or to be deficient in source protection, disinfec-
tion, control of disinfections, clarification capabilities, control of clarification, or having 
pressure less than 20 pounds per square inch in some areas of the distribution system. Id. at 
15. Surveillance programs were judged either to meet the criteria or not to meet one or both 
of the following: (1) Collection of the required number of samples (as specified in the DWS 
at 42 C.F.R. § 72.203) for no less than 11 out of the prior 12 months. (2) Passing the bacteriol-
ogical quality standard for at least 11 of those prior 12 months. Id. at 15. 
" Id. at i. For the DWS see 42 C.F.R. § 72.201, et seq. (1975). 
'" Id. at i. See supra, note 38. 
" Id. at iv. See supra, note 38 for criteria used in determining a treatment plant deficiency. 
" A cross-connection is a pipe which connects a clean water line to a waste line, generally 
occurring in a building's plumbing system. Notwithstanding the use of valves in the cross-
connection pipes, the waste water can contaminate the clean water. (Information received 
from Mr. Taylor of EPA's Water Supply Office in Boston, Mass.) 
" Id. at xii, 63-65. 77S;' of the operators were deficient in microbiological and 72Sr in 
chemistry training. 
" Id. at vii. The standards for determining the sufficiency of sampling were the frequencies 
specified by the DWS at 42 C.F.R., § 72.203. 
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by the DWS.45 Implicit in these findings was the need to develop 
standards which had a broader scope to protect the public safety. 
The study also recommended that state and federal programs to 
train water system personnel be expanded.48 Another recommenda-
tion was that someone not employed by the public water system 
should review operation procedures and the adequacy of the physi-
cal facilities on a regular basisY 
The CWSS played a key role in focusing attention on the prob-
lems in the area of drinking water safety.48 In 1970, the year the 
study was released, legislation was introduced in Congress to estab-
lish a national program to contend with the problems of drinking 
water safety. 49 In the following year Congressional committees 
commenced hearings concerning the problems. However, both 
houses of Congress could not agree on a national program in the area 
of drinking water safety for four years. 
II. THE DELIBERATIONS OF CONGRESS 
Testimony before Congressional committees indicated several 
possible and interrelated reasons for the deficiencies indicated by 
the CWSS. One problem was the public's lack of awareness concern-
ing both the quality of water they drank and the health hazards 
related to drinking contaminated waters.50 Another problem, on 
which the CWSS had focused attention, was that "governments at 
all levels ... have not developed, applied, and enforced adequate 
standards and procedures for protection of the public's health."51 In 
addition, the hearings indicated a need for expanded research in the 
field of drinking water safety.52 
Once the existence of the problems noted above was recognized, 
the far more difficult task of assembling a legislative program to 
contend with them presented itself. While some proposals were ac-
" [d. at xi. 
" [d. at xii. 
" [d. at 61. The study did not specify who that someone should be. This issue resulted in 
strong disagreement at the Congressional Hearings. 
" Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 338. Representative Carter, referring to the 
CWSS, stated that the potential danger it had indicated was "one of the things that 
[brought] about this bill [SDWAJ." 
" [d. at 51-52. 
'" UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6459 (1974). See text at note 84, infra, for 
further discussion of the lack of public awareness. 
"I [d. at 6459. 
" See text at note 54, infra. 
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ceptable to most of the interested parties, others resulted in heated 
controversy. Involved in much of this controversy was whether any 
federal involvement in the area of drinking water safety was war-
ranted and if so, how extensive that involvement should be. 
An analysis of the Congressional activity indicates that three 
broad programs were alternatively supported or opposed by the 
parties represented at the hearings. As the final form of the SDW A 
indicates, these programs were not mutually exclusive.53 The first 
program sought expanded federal research on drinking water safety. 
In conjunction with this research, the federal government would 
provide technical assistance to state and local drinking water pro-
grams and establish standards for contaminant levels in drinking 
water. The second program suggested was the enforcement of con-
taminant standards. The third program concentrated on providing 
federal financial assistance to state water supply programs. 
Program I: Federal Research and Drinking Water Standards 
Testimony at the Congressional hearings indicated that inade-
quate knowledge existed concerning which contaminants were en-
tering drinking water supplies, the impact of contaminants on pub-
lic health, and means to eliminate contaminants from the drinking 
water supplies. Commenting on these inadequacies, the executive 
director of the National Water Wells Association stated: "[w]e 
especially must not lose sight of research and development needs 
which exist today. In order to safeguard the health of the American 
public by having the machinery to detect, to analyze, and to remove 
any hazards in water, many studies must be undertaken."54 
Proponents of expanded research at the federal level had two 
basic arguments. One contention was that federal research would 
avoid duplication of programs and lead to the most efficient use of 
skilled personne1.55 The other argument was that the federal govern-
53 See text at note 111, infra . 
.. Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 120. Testimony of Jay Lehr. At a Senate 
Hearing Ralph Nader noted: 
Even a properly operated conventional treatment plant which handles bacteria, color, and 
turbidity is not geared to handle the spectrum of new toxic chemicals which have found 
their way into the water system. 
Hearings on S. 1478, supra note 30, at 58. 
55 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 330. John Vogt, the chairman of the Conference 
of State Sanitary Engineers, argued that, H[rJesearch can be best pursued at the Federal 
level, thereby eliminating needless duplication at the State ... level." 
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ment had greater financial and research capabilities. 56 In conjunc-
tion with their general support for expanded federal research, most 
interested parties favored federal programs for the training of water 
plant personnel. 57 
Beyond suggesting expanded research, proponents of the first pro-
gram sought new federal standards. As was noted above, the DWS 
had been used by a large number of states as criteria for establishing 
the safety of their drinking water.58 The DWS, however, had been 
criticized by the CWSS.5U Testimony at the Congressional hearings 
reaffirmed these criticisms, indicating that the DWS were ". . . 
incomplete in major areas of known contamination ... [They do] 
not provide for any standards relating to mercury and other heavy 
metals, ... pesticides, [and] herbicides ... to name a few areas. 
[U]sing the present Drinking Water Standards as the evaluative 
measure [for water quality] has to represent the most minimum 
approach."60 Such criticisms indicated a need for new standards to 
cover a wide range of contaminants. In addition many parties saw 
a need to create federal minimum standards for water quality which 
would apply to all public water systems.61 Similar to reasons for 
supporting basic federal research, one argument for such standards 
was the greater scientific and financial resources available to the 
federal government. Robert Fri, the deputy administrator of the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), argued 
that the 
EPA should be authorized to set national drinking water standards, 
which would be addressed to all health-related limits [on contami-
nants]. [This problem] should be a Federal responsibility because ... 
" Hearings on H.R. 14899 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1972). An EPA 
statement noted that, "[f]ederal research, technical assistance, ... and training should be 
provided ... to develop and disseminate the scientific data and methodology that are be-
yond the capability of the state and local entities involved in the supply and protection of 
drinking water." 
57 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 312; Hearings on S. 433 and S. 1735, Before 
the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 
(1973). 
" See text at note 27, supra. 
" See text at note 45, supra . 
.. Hearings on S. 1478, supra note 30, at 54 (testimony of Ralph Nader). Leonard Dworsky 
called for the". . . effective development of standards of chemical quality for drinking water 
as well as standards for biological, physical, radiological, or other contaminants and for other 
desirable qualities of drinking water." Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 599. 
" See, supra, note 28 indicating the limited application of the DWS. 
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the Federal Government can bring greater resources to assess the com-
plex health and technical aspects involved.62 
A second argument offered was the need for uniform quality stan-
dards among all water systemsY 
The establishment of federal standards which would apply to all 
water systems was not favored by all parties.64 Other parties saw no 
need to have a law requiring that all water system comply with the 
standards. The president of the American Water Works Association, 
Thurston Larson, argued that if standards were only specified for 
water used by interstate carriers, public water systems would volun-
tarily accept them.65 
Although general support existed for federal standards which 
specified maximum contaminant levels, water works groups were 
firmly opposed to standards which would specify operation and 
maintenance procedures for water treatment plants. The opponents 
to operation and maintenance standards argued that such stan-
dards would be inflexible and if not continually revised, would lead 
to requiring outdated methods. This position received support from 
Ralph Nader when he stated that" ... restrictive design criteria 
issued by state regulatory agencies [are factors] at the heart of an 
outmoded strategy for purifying drinking water."66 A related argu-
ment was that operation standards would prevent the water systems 
from doing an adequate job: "[I]nnovation and flexibility have 
been the secret weapon of the industry ... [and] the glaciation 
promised by 'standards for construction and maintenance' would 
hold promise of preventing it from doing its job."6i Another argu-
ment was that specific operational standards were impossible to 
write because of varying conditions across the country.58 
" Hearings on H.R. 14899. supra note 56, at 45. 
" Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 107. Supporting this argument, Mr. Fri urged that 
" ... the establishment of these primary standards should be a Federal responsibility be-
cause standards for health protection do not vary with locality." 
.. Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 115. Congressman Schmitz of California chal-
lenged any presumption that the Federal Government would administer a better safe drinking 
water program than the states . 
.. [d. at 146 (testimony of Thurston Larson). 
" Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 89. 
" Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 146-47 (testimony of Thurston Larson) . 
.. Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 118. The main arguments for operational standards 
were that systems would not adopt modern technology rapidly enough on their own and that 
certain contaminants cannot be measured in water and thus can only be effectively controlled 
by specifying the means for control. 
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Program II: Enforcement of Contaminant Standards 
The second proposed program was concerned with ensuring that 
public water systems would comply with federal standards. Certain 
parties were opposed to any enforcement procedures, believing that 
" ... cooperative teamwork and spirit between water plant opera-
tors and regulatory agencies should be ... encouraged in the in-
terest of producing ... a safe ... water supply," and that this 
approach would be ". . . more effective than enforcement pro-
cedures."69 The more general view, however, was that " ... it 
wouldn't make much sense for us to set up national standards with-
out any way to enforce the standards. . . . "iO 
The real controversy concerned the allocation of enforcement au-
thority among the various levels of government. Three possibilities 
were considered. The first would have precluded any federal author-
ity and placed the entire responsibility with the state governments. 
The second would have given the states primary enforcement au-
thority but allowed the federal government to enforce where state 
enforcement had broken down. The third would have given the 
states and federal governments coterminous enforcement authority. 
Proponents of exclusive state enforcement authority argued that 
states already had legislative authority to carry out the necessary 
inspections and insure compliance with the standards and that the 
state programs only needed financial support to become effective.71 
Another argument was that the federal government could not prac-
ticably monitor the 30,000 to 40,000 existing public water systems,72 
since the personnel requirements and financial demands would be 
enormous. 
The opponents of federal enforcement authority presented addi-
tional arguments as to why the federal government should not re-
ceive that authority. They made the general argument that al-
though state drinking water programs had experienced problems, no 
reason existed to "feel that extending Federal surveillance into this 
area will enhance control."73 They also argued that 
.. Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 319 (testimony of Stanley Kappe of the Ameri-
can Academy of Environmental Engineers). 
10 [d. at 33. 
71 Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 143 (testimony of Wesley Gilbertson). 
72 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 150 (testimony of Charles Johnson of the 
American Public Health Association). 
73 [d. at 670 (statement of Robert Will of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California) . 
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[e]ach and every state had statutory authority and surveillance and 
enforcement programs over community water supplies. [Therefore] 
Federal enforcement would result in a gross duplication of effort which 
would be costly in dollars and ... scarce technical manpower.74 
The opponents also argued that as a result of federal enforcement 
"[c]onfusion would be compounded with directives to water 
suppliers from two levels of Government [state and federal]."75 
Their final argument was that federal enforcement authority would 
render state programs ineffective, and was based on the proposition 
that if a state government believes that the federal government 
would do the job for it, then the state government would not do it 
themselves. William Ruckelshaus lent some credence to this argu-
ment by stating that". . . where the Federal Government says, 'We 
are going to come in and take [an environmental program] over,' 
the state and local governments tend to do nothing."76 
The proponents of allowing the federal government to take action 
only where the states had failed, although leaving the states to bear 
most of the enforcement responsibility, believed that backup au-
thority in the EPA was necessary.77 This group, however, was also 
aware of the problem noted above, that when the federal govern-
ment steps into a program the state governments tend to back out. 
Sensitive to this problem was a statement by Representative Nelsen 
that "if we pass a law it will need to have some teeth~ At the same 
time, we shouldn't go so far that you discourage local incentive from 
stepping into the picture."78 The proponents of backup federal en-
forcement authority believed that it struck a proper balance be-
tween the need for federal authority and the need for state and local 
responsibility and initiative. 
The proponents of coterminous state and federal enforcement 
" [d. at 331. At a Senate Hearing John Vogt noted: "The duplicative aspects of Federal 
inspections, monitoring, laboratory surveillance, et cetera, now being experienced in ... 
[other] environmental program area[s] need to be expressly avoided." Hearings on S. 1478, 
supra note 30, at 70. 
75 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 331 (testimony of John Vogt). 
" [d. at 519. Ruckelshaus also noted that Federal enforcement may not be necessary in the 
area of drinking water because "[w]e don't have precisely the same kind of situation that 
we have in water pollution. . . where the states traditionally have not been good enforcers 
because they compete very strongly for the location of industry in their areas." [d. at 359. 
77 A statement by Representative William Rogers indicated what this group viewed as the 
proper relationship between the state and federal governments. Rogers stated: "[Wle want 
the states to do it [enforce], and only after the states will not do it; ... won't protect the 
public, then would we have the Federal Government do it." [d. at 343. 
" [d. at 335. 
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authority took the position that showing deference to the states by 
giving them exclusive enforcement authority until they failed was 
unnecessary and inappropriate. They felt that the past inadequacies 
of state enforcement programs required that the federal government 
be able at any time to enforce compliance with the water standards. 
Ralph Nader argued that. the benefit of this approach was that 
"[y]ou ... have two options for enforcement. If the locals are 
reluctant to enforce or they don't have enough resources to enforce, 
then always the Federal Government could come in cotermi-
nously. "79 
Beyond the allocation of control, the enforcement program raised 
another issue: if the federal government were to receive enforcement 
authority, of what enforcement powers woulcl. such authority con-
sist. One group favored provisions for EPA administrative orders to 
secure compliance with the standards.80 This group apparently be-
lieved that the time required to secure compliance would be a cru-
cial factor in protecting the public health and that the delay while 
awaiting some form of judicial action would be too hazardous. Op-
posed to this position were those concerned that authorizing EPA 
administrative orders would give the EPA too much power.RI While 
recognizing that "there must be some way that people can be as-
sured of clean, safe, drinking water," this group believed it was 
unwarranted to give" ... a Federal bureau the authority to go in 
[a state] and with one fell swoop say you must do this or that 
• • • • "82 This group apparently felt that the EPA should have to go 
to court when a system failed to comply with drinking water stan-
dards and that the court should decide what was the appropriate 
remedial action.83 
71 Hearings on S. 147B, supra note 30, at 65. This coterminous approach sought to eliminate 
any delays incident to giving the states an exclusive first-shot at a problem . 
.. Hearings on H.R. 14899, supra note 56, at 45. Robert Fri, the deputy administrator of 
the EPA stated: "[T]he Administrator [EPA] should have specific authority to institute 
administrative orders as appropriate to regulate uses of the water supplies in question, to 
prohibit new connections, and to regulate the source of contamination or to prohibit delivery 
of the contaminated water." This approach would have given the EPA authority similar to 
that which it has under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA). See, 33 
U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
"' 5 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1299 (1974). Attempts to give EPA authority to issue 
compliance orders received little support because of what was termed EPA's "high-handed 
and arbitrary" action under the Air and Water Pollution Acts . 
.. 120 CONGo REc. 10789 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974). Representative Nelsen arguing at a House 
debate. 
8' 1d. at 10794. Congressman Rogers stated that " ... to prevent administrative autocracy 
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A third issue concerning enforcement was the extent to which the 
general public should be notified when a water system was not 
complying with the national standards. Supporters of public notifi-
ciation believed that the public was unaware of the dangers in their 
water supplies and that "[o]verconfidence or apathy seems to per-
vade the public's attitude with respect to drinking water."84 They 
believed that if the public were informed of the hazards in their 
drinking water they would demand better water treatment facilities. 
In support of this view, Ralph Nader argued that: "[U]nless we 
. . . embark on a major education program, the support for the 
necessary investment and more effective purification processes. . . 
will not be forthcoming soon."85 The supporters of public notifica-
tion also argued that notification would lead to more effective en-
forcement of the water standards. As stated by one commentator: 
"[I]f the public were notified of . . . their water supplies' . . . 
chemical and bacterial quality, then the public certainly would ... 
in a case of non-compliance, compel the local agencies, [and] the 
states. . . to comply. "88 
Rather then calling for its exclusion, opponents of public notifica-
tion argued that the extent to which it was used should be limited. 
The Conference of State Sanitary Engineers cautioned against "the 
compulsory provisions of public notification ... and [argued for] 
the provision of options to enable judgments to be made on the 
public health needs of such notification. "87 The Engineers also 
argued that " ... public notices in all instances [of non-
compliance] will do more harm than good. [It] can well degenerate 
into the self-defeating cry of wolf. Public notification should be 
used sparingly enough so that it has real clout."88 
Program III: Federal Financial Assistance 
The third program involved federal financial assistance to state 
drinking water programs. Two possible forms of assistance were 
by EPA, the bill requires the EPA to go to courts and justify the actions taken for the public 
welfare." 
" SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 2. 
" Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 90. At a House Hearing Charles Johnson argued: 
"If the state called attention to it [low water quality] and nothing were done, ... the public 
would force the local water utility to do its job." Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 
160 . 
.. Hearings on S. 1478, supra note 30, at 65 (testimony of Wayne Moore). 
" Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 130 . 
.. [d. at 131. 
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considered at the hearings. The first was federal financial assistance 
for the construction and maintenance of drinking water treatment 
facilities; the second, federal financial assistance for state monitor-
ing and surveillance programs. Supporters of construction grants 
argued that: "[S]tate program grants in adequate amounts are 
essential to a national wa~er supply program or such a program is 
doomed to failure .... [A]n adequate national water supply pro-
gram requires substantial commitment of Federal financial re-
sources if it has any chance of success."MU The supporters also argued 
that making standards for safe water in the Act was senseless, if the 
federal government did not make financial provisions for the various 
communities to comply with the standards that EPA set forth.uO 
Those opposed to construction grants argued that they were nei-
ther "necessary [n]or desirable."ul These opponents believed that 
the water treatment industry" ... should be able to program 
within their revenues the ability to construct and modernize water 
treatment plants."u2 They also argued that "[t]oo many projects 
[were] likely to be held up awaiting a grant, at the sacrifice of the 
health and welfare of the public,"u3 and that construction grants 
would lessen state initiative to fund their own projects and thus 
". . . serve to help weaken State responsibility. "U~ A final argument 
was that considering the financial position of the federal govern-
ment, it was not the time to authorize substantial expenditure 
of federal money,U5 and that a preferable approach would be to af-
ford the States and the public water systems a reasonable time to 
implement changes necessary to comply with standards. 9R 
Proponents of surveillance and monitoring program grants could 
point to the CWSS which had indicated that: 
HI [d. at 130 (statement of the Conference of State Sanitary Engineers) . 
.. 120 CONGo REc. 10821 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974) (argument by Mr. Kazen). Leonard 
Dworsky favored limiting aid to "the small communities [that] do need help." Hearings on 
H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 644. 
II Hearings on S. 1478, supra note 30, at 33 (testimony of Robert Fri, deputy administrator 
of the EPA). 
'2 Hearings on H.R. 1093, supra note 12, at 307 (testimony of Charles Johnson of the 
American Public Health Association). 
t. [d. at 321 (testimony of Stanley Kappe of the American Academy of Environmental 
Engineers) . 
.. Hearings on H.R. 14899, supra note 56, at 46 (testimony of Robert Fri). 
I. 120 CONGo REc. 10788 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974) (statement by Congressman Rogers). 
II [d. at 10788. 
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[e]xpanded State and local surveillance programs would continue to 
upgrade water supply systems, [and that] [o]n a national basis, an 
estimated 14-million dollar increase in State programs is needed to con-
duct the recommended water system inspection, . . . sampling, [and] 
. . . analyses . . . .»7 
Those who favored the use of federal financial assistance to fill the 
gaps in state monitoring programs considered the grants essential 
to a successful drinking water program.9R They apparently believed 
the needed funds would not be forthcoming from the state govern-
ments. Similar to the opposition voiced to construction grants, op-
ponents of monitoring grants argued that: "[t]he costs of ... test-
ing and monitoring should be borne by the users of the water sup-
ply. "99 To opponents of monitoring grants, past experience had 
". . . shown that an adequate safe drinking water program can be 
funded from State and local sources."1I1O 
The Deliberations End 
The Congressional hearings, which had commenced in 1971, con-
tinued for four years before the SDWA finally passed. The Senate 
had approved drinking water legislation on June 22, 1973, but the 
House of Representatives was unable to approve legislation until 
more than a year later. lol This delay had various causes. As was 
noted above, water works groups were adamantly opposed to federal 
enforcement of drinking water standards and to provisions for oper-
ation and maintenance standards. \02 The Administration also op-
posed federal enforcement and operation and maintenance stan-
dards as well as federal financial assistance to state programs. \11:1 In 
addition, the 1974 National Governors Conference opposed the leg-
islation, claiming it would preempt state responsibility for drinking 
water safety.lo4 Finally, the oil industry lobbied heavily against the 
Act's provisions for underground injection control. I05 In November 
" BUREAU OF WATER HYGIENE, supra note 3, at xii. The study did not specify how much 
was already being spent . 
.. Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 180. Ruth Clusen of the League of Women Voters 
noted the need " ... for grants to states to strengthen water system supervision pro-
grams .... " 
.. Hearings on S. 433, supra note 57, at 56. 
'00 [d. at 56 (statement of Robert Fri). 
'0' UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6454, 6456 (1974). 
,., See text at notes 66-76, supra. 
"13 5 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. at 847 (1974). 
"" [d. at 1167. 
III' [d. at 1298. 
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of 1974, however, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the 
EPA published reports that linked certain pollutants found in 
drinking water with cancer}06 These reports and the public pressure 
they produced gave the House the impetus needed to pass legisla-
tion on November 19, 1974.107 By December 3,1974, both houses of 
Congress had agreed on legislation. The pressure generated by the 
carcinogen reports,108 as well as the overwhelming bi-partisan Con-
gressional support for the legisiationl09 apparently convinced Presi-
dent Ford to sign the bill into law, despite the misgivings he had 
concerning it. 110 
III. THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT OF 1974 
The purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act is to "assure that 
water supply systems serving the public meet minimum national 
standards for protection of public health."1II As the analysis of the 
Congressional hearings and debates indicated, however, widespread 
disagreement developed as to the type of program which would be 
most appropriate to achieve that purpose. This disagreement was 
based not only on divergent political interests, but also on a lack of 
consensus as to what was the most effective means to achieve the 
objective of safe drinking water. With this background the SDWA 
predictably resulted from a compromise between the various oppos-
ing positions. Rather than indicating a Congressional decision that 
one program was more effective than the other, the Act represents 
an accumulation of most of the proposals which were suggested at 
the Congressional hearings. Notwithstanding the compromises and 
uncertainties underlying the formation of the Act, and the legal and 
policy problems which it now presents, a significant step has been 
.". [d. at 1128. 
,,11 [d. at 1167. 
"1M [d. at 1297. 
"" [d. at 1234. 
lin See text at note 103, supra. 
"' UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6454 (1974). Congress found a direct 
relationship between the public health aspects of drinking water and interstate commerce. 
Relying on this relationship Congress used an interstate commerce rationale as the 
constitutional basis for their action in the area of drinking water. The Congress had found 
that waterborne disease outbreaks may well inhibit interstate travel and tourism; that em-
ployees becoming ill from unsafe water would curtail activities of industries in interstate 
commerce; that migrant employees would not travel into states having unsafe water or would 
be excluded from states if they had contracted a disease from unsafe water; and that contami-
nants entered the water from industries involved in interstate commerce. UNITED STATES CODE 
CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6461 (1974). 
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taken toward the objective of providing safe drinking water to the 
American public. 
The SDWA: Sections 300i through 300g-1 
The Act's initial section defines, inter alia, the terms "contami-
nant," "public water system" and "primary drinking water regula-
tion."112 The following section specifies the public water systems 
which are subject to the national primary drinking water regula-
tions.1J3 
Section 300g-1 specifies a two-stage procedure for the EPA to 
follow in establishing national primary drinking water regulations. 
The initial stage is the development of interim regulations. After 
proposing interim regulations and providing opportunity for com-
ment,1I4 the Administrator [of the EPA, hereinafter, unless 
otherwise specified] was to promulgate interim regulations within 
180 days of December 16,1974.115 The interim regulations are to take 
effect 18 months after promulgation. 1l6 Their purpose is to ". . . 
protect health to the extent feasible, using technology, treatment 
techniques, and other means, which the Administrator determines 
are generally available (taking costs into consideration) on Decem-
ber 16, 1974."117 
112 42 u.s.c. § 300f (Supp. IV, 1974). 
113 Included in the coverage of § 300g are all "public water systems" as defined in § 300£(4), 
except those meeting four specific criteria for exclusion. Section 300f(4) defines "public water 
system" as: "[A] system for the provision to the public of piped water for human consump-
tion, if such system has at least fifteen service connections or regularly serves at least twenty-
five individuals. Such term includes (A) any collection, treatment, storage and distribution 
facilities under control of the operator of such system and used primarily in connection with 
such system, and (B) any collection or pretreatment storage facilities not under such control 
which are used primarily in connection with such system. Section 300g specifies that the four 
criteria necessary for exclusion are that it be a public water system " ... (1) which consists 
only of distribution and storage facilities (and does not have any collection and treatment 
facilities); (2) which obtains all of its water from, but is not owned or operated by, a public 
water system to which such regulations apply; (3) which does not sell water to any person; 
and (4) which is not a carrier which conveys passengers in interstate commerce (emphasis 
added). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). The Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] 
was given the responsibility of administering the SDWA's drinking water program. As was 
stated supra, at note 23, the EPA had had the authority to establish and revise the DWS 
since 1970. In addition, the EPA was administering the water pollution program under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. With this background, EPA was the logical 
choice to administer the SDWA's drinking water program. 
"' 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). For these regulations, see 40 Fed. Reg. 59566 
(1975). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
117 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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The second stage is the development of revised national primary 
drinking water regulations. The Administrator is to arrange for the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study to deter-
mine maximum drinking water contaminant levels which would 
protect the health of persons from any known or anticipated adverse 
health effects. NAS is also to determine the existence of any con-
taminants the levels of which cannot be determined in drinking 
water, but which may have an adverse effect on the health of per-
sons. IIK The results of the NAS study are to be reported to Congress 
within two years of December 16, 1974.1\9 
Within ten days of when Congress receives the NAS report, the 
Administrator is to publish the study's proposals for recommended 
maximum contaminant levels and the list of dangerous contami-
nant whose levels in drinking water cannot be determined. 120 Within 
90 days of publishing the NAS proposals the Administrator is to 
establish recommended contaminant levels for each contaminant 
which he determines, on the basis of the NAS study, may have an 
adverse effect on the health of persons. 121 The Administrator is also 
to list the contaminants whose level in water cannot be accurately 
enough determined to establish recommended maximum contami-
nant levels but which may adversely affect the health of persons. 122 
When the Administrator publishes the recommended maximum 
contaminant levels and the list of contaminants, he is also to pro-
pose revised national primary drinking water regulations. 123 Pur-
suant to § 300g-1 (d) the Administrator is to provide opportunity to 
comment on the proposed regulations. After providing the oppor-
tunity to comment and within 180 days of the date of the proposal 
of the regulations, the Administrator is to promulgate revised 
"M 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(e}(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). The House Committee intended that the 
NAS study only consider what is required for the protection of the public health, and not 
what is technologically or economically feasible or reasonable. UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND 
ADMIN. NEWS 6471 (1974). 
". 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(e)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'~I 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(b)(l}(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(b)(l)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). The section specifies that: 
Each such recommended maximum contaminant level shall be set at a level which, in the 
Administrator's judgment based on such [NASI report, no known or anticipated adverse 
effects on health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety (empha-
sis added) . 
• 22 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(b)(l)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974) . 
• 23 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). The revised regulations will specify how they 
are to replace the interim regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-1(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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primary regulations. 124 The revised regulations are to take effect 18 
months after the date of their promulgation. 125 
The revised regulations are to specify a maximum contaminant 
level or require the use of a treatment technique for each contami-
nant for which the Administrator establishes a recommended maxi-
mum contaminant level. The regulations are also to specify treat-
ment techniques for contaminants whose levels cannot be accur-
ately enough determined in drinking water. The contaminant levels 
specified in the revised regulations should be as close to the recom-
mended maximum contaminant level as is "feasible."126 Further-
more, when a revised regulation requires a treatment technique for 
a contaminant with a recommended maximum contaminant level, 
the contaminant level should be brought as close to the recom-
mended level as is "feasible." When a revised regulation requires a 
treatment technique for a contaminant which cannot be accurately 
measured in drinking water, it should prevent known or anticipated 
adverse health effects to the extent which the Administrator deter-
mines is "feasible."127 
The interim and revised primary regulations represent the back-
bone of the SDWA. They establish uniform minimum standards for 
drinking water quality that must be met by all public water systems 
covered by the Act. The regulations will also act as an incentive for 
public water systems by establishing an objective they must work 
toward. Their most significant role, however, will be to indicate 
whether a local public water system is providing safe water to its 
customers, and, where it is not, to indicate that something must be 
done to ensure that safe water will be provided in the future. 
The effectiveness of the primary regulations will be enhanced if 
certain ambiguities in § 300g-1 are clarified or eliminated. The 
initial problem concerns the development of the interim primary 
regulations. Although covering certain additional contaminants, the 
interim regulations actually promulgated by EPA are little more 
than revisions of the DWS.128 In fact, in a statement accompanying 
'21 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). Assuming that each step takes the maximum 
time allotted, this process could take four years, three months, and ten days. 
,28 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). See text at notes 137-41, infra, for discussion 
of "feasible." 
'27 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). Authority also exists for the establishment 
of national secondary drinking water regulations at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(c) (1974). 
,2' For the DWS see 42 C.F.R. § 72.201 (1975). For the interim regulations see 40 Fed. Reg. 
59566 (1975); The interim regulations set limits for mercury and certain organic pesticides, 
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the regulations, the EPA stated that: "Congress anticipated that 
the initial Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations would be 
based on the. . . Standards of 1962 [DWS] and this Congressional 
intent has been followed. "129 The report accompanying the Act when 
it left a house committee stated an intent that the interim regula-
tions be "established quickly" and anticipated that "they would be 
based largely on a review and updating of the PHS drinking water 
standards."I30 If the Congressional language were the standard for 
determining the sufficiency of the interim regulations, the regula-
tions would present little difficulty. Their failure to include levels 
or treatment techniques for various contaminants, such as organic 
chemicals and viruses, 131 could be explained by the failure of the 
DWS to include such contaminants and the requirement that the 
interim regulations be "established quickly."132 The statutory lan-
guage, however, makes it clear that the Administrator's objective in 
formulating the interim regulations should be to "protect health to 
the extent feasible ... "133 and should not be limited to simply revis-
ing the DWS. If the statutory language, rather than the Congres-
sionallanguage, is the standard for measuring the sufficiency of the 
interim regulations, the promulgated interim regulations may be 
subject to challenge if one could establish that" ... technology, 
treatment techniques, and other means ... were generally avail-
able to the Administrator, (taking costs into consideration) on 
December 16, 1974,"134 which would have made greater protection 
of the public health feasible. In fact, the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF) commenced a suit against the Administrator of the 
EPA on December 17, 1975, based on such a claim.135 Resolution of 
that suit may determine not only which standard determines the 
sufficiency of the interim regulations, but in addition whether the 
which had not been done in the DWS. The interim regulations failed to set limits for radiation 
whereas such limits had been set by the DWS. 
". 40 Fed. Reg. 59567 (1975). 
130 UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN NEWS 6470 (1974) . 
• ". 6 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1412 (1975). 
132 See, 42 C.F.R. § 72.201 (1975). 
0:" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a)(2). "To the extent feasible" is defined as" ... using technology, 
treatment techniques and other means, which the Administrator determines are generally 
available (taking costs into consideration) on December 16, 1974." The necessity for effective 
interim regulations is highlighted by the fact that the revised regulations will not be estab-
lished for approximately three years and will not go into effect until 18 months after they are 
promulgated. See text at notes 118-25, supra, for outline of time periods involved . 
• " 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974) . 
• ,,', 6 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1412 (1975). 
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interim regulations as promulgated satisfy that standard,I3s 
The meaning of the term "feasible" in the context of the revised 
primary regulations presents another problem,I37 For purposes of the 
revised regulations, "feasible" means "with the use of the best tech-
nology, treatment techniques, and other means, which the Adminis-
trator finds are generally available (taking costs into considera-
tion),"138 While this recurring term "feasible" leaves the Adminis-
trator wide discretion in establishing the revised regulations, a 
house report indicates that the Administrator's discretion to deter-
mine what technologies and treatment techniques are generally 
available should be limited,I39 The house committee had concluded 
that cost-effective systems are necessary to provide safer drinking 
water and that larger systems are generally more cost-effective than 
smaller systems,140 Therefore, the committee intended that the 
Administrator, when determining what treatment techniques are 
generally available, consider those generally available to larger and 
more efficient metropolitan and regional public water systems, 
rather than those generally available to smaller sized systems,141 
Another issue presented by § 300g-1 concerns its provision for 
primary regulations which specify treatment techniques for certain 
contaminants, 142 The § 300f(1) definition of "primary drinking water 
regulations" limited specifications for treatment techniques to those 
contaminants whose level it is not economically or technolog-
ically feasible to ascerta'in,143 This limited use of treatment tech-
niques is supported by the house report which states that ", , , 
revised primary regulations must specify , , , 'a contaminant 
level (or treatment methods, [only] if monitoring is infeasible) 
, , , .' "IH Section 300g-1(b)(3), however, allows treatment tech-
niques to be specified for a contaminant without consideration as 
to whether its level in water is feasible to ascertain,145 The EPA 
13. The Act does permit amendment of the interim regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a)(1), 
(Supp. IV, 1974). 
131 See text at notes 126-27, supra. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'30 UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6470 (1974). 
"" [d. at 6470-71. 
'" [d. at 6470-71. The Committee recognized that: "In general, this means larger systems 
are to be encouraged and smaller systems discouraged." 
'" "Treatment techniques" and "operational and maintenance standards," discussed in 
the text at notes 66-68, supra are synonymous. 
'43 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)(c)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
,,, UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6473 (1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-l(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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should accept the limitation on the use of treatment technique 
requirements found in § 300f(1)(c)(ii). As was noted in the hearings 
preceding enactment of the SDWA, treatment technique require-
ments tend to become inflexible and may retard the development 
of new water treatment technologies. 148 Thus, limited application of 
treatment technique requirements to contaminants which are im-
measurable and cannot be effectively controlled by specifying con-
taminant levels is desirable, whereas unlimited application of treat-
ment technique requirements to any contaminant, notwithstanding 
the ability to monitor its level in drinking water and therefore con-
trol it by specifying a contaminant level, would be unwarranted. l47 
If the EPA should take the latter approach, an amendment might 
be necessary to limit the use of treatment technique requirements. 
The final issue concerning the primary regulations is the require-
ment that they be continually revised and updated. The revised 
primary regulations will not in all instances set contaminant levels 
equivalent to the recommended maximum contaminant level, be-
cause the primary regulations are to be set at a level only as close 
to the recommended contaminant level as is feasible. us The house 
report, however, clearly indicates that the Adminstrator should not 
be satisfied with regulations which are only as close to the recom-
mended contaminant level as is feasible. The report states that 
"[e]conomic and technological feasibility are to be considered ... 
only for the purpose of determining how soon it is possible to reach 
recommended maximum contaminant levels .... "149 Therefore, 
the Administrator has an affirmative duty to closely study improve-
ments in technology, treatment techniques, and other means which 
make it feasible for primary regulation contaminant levels to ap-
proach recommended maximum contaminant levels. This duty is 
affirmed by § 300g-1(b)(4), which requires the Administrator to 
amend primary regulations whenever" ... technology, treatment 
techniques, and other means permit greater protection of the health 
of persons .... "150 
'"~ See text at notes 66-68, supra. 
'" See text at note 200, infra, indicating that variances are allowed from treatment 
techniques requirements. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). For example, if the recommended level is 100 
parts of lead per gallon of water while it is only feasible to limit it to 120 parts per gallon, 
then the primary regulation would specify a level of 120. The objective, however, remains 100. 
'" UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6472 (1974). 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974). The section also requires the Administrator 
to review the regulations every three years. 
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The SDWA: Sections 300g-2 and 300g-3 
Responsibility for enforcing the primary regulations, which is 
shared between state governments and the EPA, is detailed in § § 
300g-2 and 300g-3. The federal government, through the EPA, ini-
tially has the authority to enforce the primary regulations in any 
state. 151 A state may secure primary enforcement responsibility, 
however, by applying for it through the EPA. When the Administra-
tor determines that the state meets criteria specified in the Act, 
primary enforcement responsibility shifts to the state. 152 Where a 
state has secured primary enforcement responsibility only four spe-
cific circumstances authorize the EPA to enforce the primary regu-
lations. 
The first circumstance is where the Administrator orders that a 
state's primary enforcement responsibility be revoked. Pursuant to 
§ 300g-2(b)(1), the Administrator must specify a procedure by 
which he will determine whether the specific criteria for state pri-
mary enforcement responsibility are no longer satisfied. 153 Section 
300g-2 (a) specifies that a state has primary responsibility only 
when the Administrator determines that the specific criteria are 
met. Thus when the Administrator determines that a state no longer 
I,,. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). The EPA only loses authority to enforce the 
primary regulations in a state which has primary enforcement responsibility. The state has 
to apply to the EPA for primary enforcement responsibility. Therefore, prior to the date when 
a state receives primary enforcement responsibility, such responsibility is held by the EPA, 
152 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). The criteria, as set forth in the statute, 
are that the state: 
1) has adopted drinking water regulations which (A) in the case of the period beginning 
on the date the national interim primary drinking water regulations are promulgated 
under section 300g-1 of this title and ending on the date such regulations take effect are 
no less stringent than such regulations, and (B) in the case of the period after such 
effective date are no less stringent than the interim and revised national primary drinking 
water regulations in effect under such section; 
2) has adopted and is implementing adequate procedures for the enforcement of such 
State regulations, including conducting such monitoring and making such inspections as 
the Administrator may require by regulation; 
3) will keep such records and make such reports with respect to its activities under 
paragraphs (1) and (2) as the Administrator may require by regulation; 
4) if it permits variances or exemptions, or both, from the requirements of its drinking 
water regulations which meet the requirements of paragraph (1), permits such variances 
and exemptions under conditions and in a manner which is not less stringent than the 
conditions under, and the manner in which variances and exemptions may be granted 
under section 300g-4 and 300g-5 of this title; and 
5) has adopted and can implement an adequate plan for the provision of safe drinking 
water under emergency circumstances. 
153 See, supra note 152, for the criteria. 
526 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:501 
meets the criteria, that state's primary enforcement responsibility 
is revoked and the EPA regains enforcement authority. 
The second circumstance in which the EPA regains the authority 
to enforce primary regulations in a state with primary responsibility 
is pursuant to § 300g-3(a). When the Administrator finds that a 
public water system is not complying with the primary regulations 
and has not received a variance or exemption, or that a public water 
system has been granted a variance or exemption but is not comply-
ing with a schedule or other requirement imposed pursuant to the 
variance or exemption, 154 he is required to notify the state of the non-
compliance and may also provide technical assistance and advice. 155 
If the non-compliance extends beyond 30 days after the state re-
ceived notice, the Administrator must then give public notice of the 
non-compliance and request that, within 15 days of the public no-
tice, the state submit a report specifying the steps being taken to 
bring the water system into compliance. 156 If the non-compliance 
extends beyond 60 days of the original notice given to the state and 
the state fails to submit the requested report or the state submits 
the report but the Administrator, after considering the report, deter-
mines that the state has abused its discretion, the Administrator 
may then act to enforce the primary regulations. 157 
The third circumstance in which the EPA regains enforcement 
authority is when such enforcement is requested by the chief execu-
tive officer of the state with the non-complying public water system 
or by the agency in the state with jurisdiction over compliance with 
the national or state drinking water regulations. 15R The final circum-
stance is in emergency situations. The criteria to be used in deter-
mining whether an emergency exists and other aspects of this provi-
sion will be discussed below. 159 
The means to enforce primary regulations had been a point of 
heated controversy at the Congressional hearings concerning the 
SDWA. As was noted above, certain groups were opposed to any 
federal enforcement authority while others considered coterminous 
authority in state and federal governments to be essential.l6O Sec-
",j See text at notes 197-203, infra, for a discussion of variances and exemptions. 
,,, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
!r,' 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). For a discussion of public notice provisions 
in the SDWA, see text at notes 186-88, infra. 
,,, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
,,, 42 U.S.C. § 300i (Supp. IV, 1974). See text at notes 211-13, infra. 
I'"~ For an analysis of these views see text at notes 69-79, supra. 
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tions 300g-2 and 300g-3 seem to represent an appropriate compro-
mise of th~se positions. Despite Congressional findings that ineffec-
tive state water programs were a primary reason for deficiencies in 
drinking water qualitY,181 state governments must still play an es-
sential role in the enforcement of the primary regulations, since the 
EPA could not effectively monitor 40,000 public water systems. The 
sections also encourage the states to develop effective programs. By 
requiring the EPA, except in four specified circumstances, to defer 
to a state's primary enforcement authority, the sections minimize 
the possibility that state governments will either depend on the 
federal government to enforce the regulations or beocme discour-
aged by unwarranted federal interference. By permitting the EPA 
to take action in specific circumstances, however, especially where 
the state has abused its discretion or in an emergency, the statute 
not only gives the states notice that if they wish to retain exclusive 
enforcement authority they must do an effective job, but it also 
provides a safety mechanism to achieve compliance when a state 
fails to do its job .182 
Sections 300g-2 and 300g-3 present other problems. Section 300g-
3(e) specifies that the Act does not preempt state or local authority 
to adopt and enforce their own regulations for public water systems. 
A positive aspect of this provision is that it enables states to con-
tinue administering viable drinking water programs when they are 
attempting to secure primary enforcement responsibility or when 
they wish to have a drinking water program but do not wish to 
secure primary enforcement authority under the SDW A.16:1 The po-
tential confusion it may create, however, is apparent. A state pro-
gram may specify one treatment technique while a primary regula-
tion may specify another for the same contaminant. A system might 
face the dilemma in which compliance with one regulation would 
constitute violation of the other. If this problem were to arise, it may 
spur an amendment to the Act which precludes states from specify-
ing treatment techniques. 
Another issue concerns the scope of "abuse of state discretion" 
18' UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6459 (1974). 
18' If federal enforcement authority had been precluded no governmental agency would be 
able to take action if the state failed to carry out its responsibilities. 
'13 See, supra note 152, for the criteria a state program must meet. Allowing states to retain 
programs should also insure that the maximum number of inspectors will be checking water 
systems. It also enables a system to gradually build up its program until the point where it 
can secure primary enforcement responsibility. 
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under § 300g-3(a)(1)(B).184 This section specifies that the Adminis-
trator may not detemine that a state abused its discretion, before 
finding, by the sixtieth day following the original noti<!e, that the 
state both failed to implement adequate procedures to bring the 
system into compliance by the earliest feasible time,165 and failed to 
assure, through alternative means, provision of safe drinking water 
by the earliest feasible time. la8 The house report, however, states the 
committee's intent that any failure by a state to implement by the 
sixtieth day adequate procedures to achieve compliance would be 
an abuse of discretion per se,la7 without any requirement that the 
state also fail to submit a plan concerning alternative provision of 
drinking water. If the Act is interpreted to require that a state both 
fail to implement adequate compliance procedures and fail to assure 
provision of alternative sources of water before the EPA can deter-
mine that the state abused its discretion, a state could avoid abus-
ing its discretion by simply submitting a plan for alternative sources 
of water and thus avoid the requirement that it implement adequate 
procedures to achieve compliance. By precluding EPA enforcement 
in circumstances where a state has not implemented adequate com-
pliance procedures, the statute would create a loophole which Con-
gress did not intend. las 
Another issue presented by § 300g-3 is whether enforcement by 
the EPA, where that enforcement is authorized, should be discre-
tionary or mandatory. In its present form, § 300g-3 permits the 
Administrator to decide whether a civil enforcement action is war-
ranted.189 Provisions for mandatory federal enforcement are 
appealing to the extent that they could limit the impact political 
pressure may have on preventing enforcement actions. 17o Given the 
, .. This circumstance is one in which the EPA may enforce the primary regulations in a 
state with primary enforcement responsibility. See text at note 157, supra. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(I)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(I)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
,,, UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6475 (1974). 
JR' Congressman Bob Eckhardt criticized the provision requiring a finding of "abuse of 
discretion." He argued that it would be so difficult to prove that it would make federal 
enforcement impossible. He wanted a provision which would have allowed the EPA to act on 
a finding that the state had failed to enforce the primary regulations. 5 BNA Env. Rep., 
Current Devs. 213 (1974). 
lA, This discretion is in contrast to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 which 
mandates that the EPA enforce violations of that Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
"0 David Zwick, a member of the Public Interest Research Group, argued this position, 
stating that, "[ e )xcessive discretion has always invited pressure from private interests to see 
that it is exercised in their favor, and the administrative agencies have always been less than 
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limited staff available to the Administrator, however, the need to 
allow the Administrator to decide which violations warrant utiliza-
tion of the EPA's limited enforcement capabilities becomes a more 
important consideration. 
The type of enforcement authority the EPA should have is an-
other issue presented by § 300g-3. Except in emergency situations, 
the EPA's enforcement action is limited to the commencement of a 
civil suit.17I If the primary regulation being violated involves a con-
taminant which is not extremely hazardous, the time required by 
the EPA to commence the civil action, present its evidence to a 
court, and receive a decision, may not pose a serious danger to the 
public. If the violation involves an extremely hazardous contami-
nant, however, but fails to fall within EPA's emergency authority, 172 
the time and uncertainty involved in the civil action may pose a 
serious threat. 173 Where a violation of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA) is found, the EPA is authorized not 
only to commence a civil suit, but in addition to issue administra-
tive compliance orders.174 EPA issues these compliance orders di-
rectly and therefore avoids the delay involved in a civil suit. The 
compliance order under the FWPCA must specify the nature of the 
violation and a time for compliance. 175 Despite the objections which 
were voiced to granting such authority to the EPA in the area of 
drinking water, the EPA should be provided with the option of 
issuing administrative compliance orders where primary regulation 
violations occur and thus provide the EPA with the flexibility neces-
sary to deal with both situations presented above. Thus, when the 
primary regulation violation can be effectively eliminated by com-
mencement of a civil suit, the EPA should be limited to that auth-
ority. When the violation requires immediate action to protect the 
public health, however (though not constituting an emergency 
under § 300i), the EPA should be empowered to issue administra-
tive compliance orders. 
diligent in the tradition oinon-enforcement." Hearings on H.R. 14899 Before the Subcomm. 
on Public Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1972). 
171 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(a)(I), (a)(2), (b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
172 See text at notes 211-13, infra, for discussion of emergency actions. 
173 This situation is especially true in states with primary enforcement responsibility. Un-
less the executive officer requests the EPA to act, it is a minimum of 60 days before the EPA 
will secure enforcement authority. 
'71 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
175 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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Where the Administrator brings a civil suit to secure compliance 
with the primary regulations, the court is to enter" ... such judg-
ment as protection of public health may require. "176 The court is also 
to consider the time necessary to comply and the availability of 
alternative water supplies. 177 The house committee, however, in-
tended that the court consider almost exclusively the public health 
aspects of non-compliance. In its report the committee stated that 
courts hearing an EPA enforcement action of a primary regulation 
" ... are not to apply traditional balancing principles used by 
equity courts. Rather, they are directed to give utmost weight to the 
Committee's paramount objective of providing maximum feasible 
protection of the public health .... "178 
The final issue presented by the enforcement sections is the incen-
tive they provide for compliance. A primary objective of the enforce-
ment provisions is to provide incentive for voluntary compliance 
with the primary regulations prior to the commencement of any 
enforcement procedures. To achieve this voluntary compliance, in-
dividual public water systems must anticipate that they will be 
inspected, that enforcement action will be taken, and that the pen-
alty for non-compliance will be substantial enough to make volun-
tary compliance an attractive alternative.179 The SDWA authorizes 
inspection and monitoring of public water systems; ISO thus the possi-
bility exists that a system will be inspected and that enforcement 
action will be commenced. lSI The Act's provisions for penalty, how-
ever, may not provide adequate incentive for voluntary compliance. 
Under § 300g-3 (b) a civil penalty is imposed only if the violation 
of the primary regulation is wilful. 182 Thus a water system cannot 
be penalized for negligently failing to comply with a drinking water 
I7R 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
171 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
11K UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6476 (1974). In enforcement actions the 
EPA should not have the burden to establish that a violation of a primary regulation endan-
gers the public health. On the House fioor, Congressman Rogers stated: "Nor is it necessary 
for the Administrator to prove that any violation of the regulation has caused or is likely to 
cause specific adverse health effects. This is to be presumed by the court .... " 120 CONGo 
REC. 10794 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974). 
I1U For a discussion of criteria to be used in evaluating enforcement provisions see, Schach-
ter, Some Criteria for Evaluating State and Local Air Pollution Control Laws, 14 B.C. IND. 
& COM. L. REV. 583, 625 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schachter]. 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4 (Supp. IV, 1974). See text at notes 233-34, infra. 
'" The likelihood of inspection and enforcement depends on state and Federal appropria-
tions for the drinking water programs, as well as the administration of the respective pro-
grams. 
,,, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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regulation. Furthermore, while the maximum penalty imposed for 
a wilful violation is $5,000 for each day the violation occurs, 183 provi-
sion is not made for a minimum penalty. 
To provide additional incentive for voluntary compliance, certain 
changes should be considered. A mandatory penalty for any non-
compliance which cannot be explained by good cause might be im-
posed. In addition, a minimum daily penalty might be effective 
by ensuring that some substantial penalty will be imposed.184 One 
point warrants further emphasis. The objective of the Act is to 
ensure safe water, not to impose penalties. Thus where a system, 
which was penalized for non-compliance, is again complying with 
the primary regulations, providing for the return to that system of 
part of the penalty imposed would be appropriate. 185 
The SDWA: Provisions for Public Notice 
Because of their special signifiance, certain provisions warrant 
separate consideration. These provisions require public notification 
in various circumstances. Under § 300g-3(a)(1)(B), in a state with 
primary enforcement responsibility, the Administrator is to give 
public notice of a primary regulation violation when a system con-
tinues to violate the regulation 30 days after the Administrator noti-
fied the state of the violation. 186 Pursuant to § 300g-3(c)(1), the 
operator of a public water system must give notice to customers of 
any failure to comply with a primary regulation. 187 Finally, pursuant 
to § 300g-3(c)(2), the operator must give notice to customers of any 
variance or exemption applying to the system as well as any failure 
to comply with a schedule prescribed pursuant to the variance or 
exemption. ISS At the Congressional hearings preceding the Act, the 
proponents of these provisions had argued that notifying the public 
concerning the safety of their drinking water was essential to the 
success of the Act. They had reasoned that lack of public awareness 
concerning drinking water quality was a primary factor contributing 
to the poor condition of water supplies.:89 If the reasoning of this 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" Schachter, supra note 179, at 632. 
'" Schachter, supra note 179, at 635. If the entire penalty were returned, however, the 
incentive to comply voluntarily might be limited. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). See text at notes 198-200, infra, for a discus-
sion of variances and exemptions. 
'" See text at notes 84-88, supra, for a discussion of their arguments. 
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group was correct, the requirement for public notification may well 
be one of the most effective means to achieve the Act's objective. 
Public demand for safe water may well insure a rapid and effective 
response to drinking water problems, and at a minimum will serve 
as a supplement to EPA and state enforcement proceedings. 
Two other comments should be made about these provisions. As 
in the case of violations of the primary regulations, a failure to give 
notice must be wilful before a penalty can be imposed.18o Water 
system operators might have greater incentive to comply with the 
notification requirments if failure to give notice was penalized ab-
sent a showing of good cause for the failure. In addition, a minimum 
fine would make punishment certain and thus provide additional 
incentive.181 The other comment concerns the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to § 300g-3(c).182 The section specifies that an 
operator must give public notice of non-compliance at least once 
every three months. 183 Pursuant to his authority to prescribe regula-
tions for the form and manner for giving public notice,184 the Admin-
istrator has specified in the interim regulations that upon failure of 
a water system to comply with a primary regulation contaminant 
level, the operator must notify the users of the system in the first 
set of bills or in any event by written notice within three months of 
the non-compliance. 185 The Administrator has also required the op-
erator to publish the notification for three consecutive days in a 
daily newspaper within fourteen days of learning of the non-
compliance, and to furnish a copy of the notice to television and 
radio stations serving the area utilizing the water supply within 
seven days of learning of the non-compliance. 188 While giving the 
water systems one to two weeks to secure compliance without de-
mands from the public, the latter requirements ensure that public 
demands will play an active role in securing compliance within two 
weeks of the non-compliance. 
The SDWA: Sections 300g-4 and 300g-5 
Section 300g-4 provides for variances from primary drinking 
II. 42 U.~.C. § 300g-3(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" Schachter, supra note 179, at 632. 
", The regulations can be found at 40 Fed. Reg. 59566 (1975). 
". 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
II. 40 Fed. Reg. 59566 (1975). 
'''ld. 
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water regulations. A state with primary enforcement responsibility 
or the EPA in a state without primary enforcement responsibility 
has authority to permit variances under two circumstances. The 
first situation is where the characteristics of the reasonably avail-
able raw water sources makes compliance impossible, despite the 
" ... application of the best technology, treatment techniques, or 
other means, which the Administrator finds are generally available 
(taking costs into consideration)."197 Under this provision, a sched-
ule must be established to bring the system into compliance. 19K The 
second situation is where a water system is granted a variance from 
a treatment technique if it can demonstrate that the quality of the 
raw water source makes the utilization of a required treatment tech-
nique unnecessary to protect public health. 199 In one additional cir-
cumstance, the EPA alone is authorized to grant a variance. Such 
a variance from a treatment technique requirement is allowed when 
the public water system can show that an " ... alternative treat-
ment technique not included in such requirement [primary regula-
tions] is at least as efficient in lowering the level of the contaminant 
with respect to which such requirement was prescribed" (emphasis 
added).20o 
Section 300g-5 provides for "exemptions" from primary regula-
tions. States with primary enforcement responsibility or the EPA in 
a state without that responsibility may grant an exemption upon a 
finding that due to compelling factors, which may include economic 
factors, a public water system is unable to comply with a contami-
nant level or treatment technique found in a primary regulation. 201 
The EPA or the state, however, must also find that the system was 
operating prior to the effective date of the regulation and that the 
exemption will not create an unreasonable risk to health.202 Another 
requirement is that a schedule be prescribed which will bring the 
.17 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4 (Supp. N, 1974). The EPA or the state must also find that the 
variance will not result in an unreasonable risk to health. 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974) . 
... 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
21111 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). In addition to the fact that a state or the EPA 
will consider different criteria in determining whether to grant an "exemption" or a "vari-
ance," the distinction between them is that § 300g-5 specifies time periods within which a 
system must comply with a primary regulation that it was exempted from whereas variances 
are open-ended, even when § 300g-4 requires prescription of schedules within which a system 
must comply with a primary regulation it received a variance from, it does not specify a time 
period within which compliance must be achieved. 
~" 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-5(a)(2), (a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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exempted system into compliance with the regulations. 203 
The provisions for variance and exemptions may be of substantial 
merit. They should ease the financial burden on communities which 
do not have access to the capital necessary to achieve immediate 
compliance with the primary regulations.204 Allowing certain sys-
tems to gradually achieve compliance also limits the need for 
substantial sums of federal monetary assistance. 205 In addition, the 
provision for variances from treatment techniques will enable sys-
tems to utilize and develop techniques which are more efficient than 
the primary regulation techniques and will therefore avoid the in-
flexibility which may have retarded the development of new tech-
niques. Unfortunately, the provisions are also of potential harm. 
Some critics have argued that variances and exemptions for eco-
nomic reasons are unnecessary and that the expense of complying 
with primary regulations would not exceed the capabilities of any 
system.20B Such exceptions present the additional possibility of cre-
ating major loopholes in the enforcement of the primary regulations. 
If the states or the EPA do not wisely exercise their discretion, they 
will grant variances and exemptions in situations where they are not 
warranted, allowing violations to go unprosecuted. Avoiding this 
potential danger will require that the EPA or the states carefully 
consider original applications for exemptions or variances. In addi-
tion, the EPA must carefully exercise its oversight authority over 
the entire variance and exemption process.207 
The SDWA: Sections 300h through 300h-3 
Sections 300h through 300h-3 establish a joint federal and state 
203 42 u.s.c. § 300g-5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
20. Senator Hart stated on the Senate floor that: 
In order to provide relief for those water supply systems which are less than able to afford 
treatment technology than the best case situation [See text at notes ]37·141, supra] 
which forms the basis for the national primary standards, a variance and exemption 
schedule is authorized. . . . 
120 CONGo REC. 20240 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974). 
205 Congressman Rogers stated on the House floor that: 
[Wle did not think now was the time to authorize substantial sums of money. We thought 
instead that we should afford the States and the public water systems a reasonable time 
to implement [primary regulationsl, taking costs into consideration. 
120 CONGo REc. 10788 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974). 
206 Robert Harris of EDF said the variances and exemption provisions were wholly unneces· 
sary and that all but the smallest systems would be able to finance improvements necessary 
for compliance. 5 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1300 (1974). 
207 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(1)(F)&(G) (Supp. IV, 1974); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5(d) (Supp. IV, 
1974). 
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program to protect underground sources of drinking water from un-
derground injections208 endangering those sources. While a detailed 
discussion of these provisions is outside the scope of this article, 
protection of underground sources of water is an important 
aspect of the Act's program to ensure provision of safe drinking 
water to the American public. As was noted at a House Committee 
hearing by Dr. Jay Lehr of the National Water Wells Association, 
"[a]s the use of underground water for drinking supplies dramati-
cally increases during this decade, the impact of underground waste 
disposal has a seriously negative effect [on the quality of the under-
ground supplies].''209 Dr. Lehr also noted that a reason for prompt 
action to control underground injection is that "[y]ou cannot ... 
flush your underground [water supplies]. The [waste] water once 
introduced will be there for decades, centuries and longer, because 
underground water moves very slowly, rarely more than a few feet 
per day."2\o These statements indicate that provisions to protect 
underground sources of water are certainly of importance today and 
will increase in importance in the future. Therefore, the Act's provi-
sions concerning underground injection control warrant careful con-
sideration as to whether they can effectively protect underground 
sources of water. 
The SDWA: Section 300(i) 
Section 300(i) of the Act enables the Administrator to take imme-
diate action when he receives information that a contaminant which 
is in or likely to enter a public water system may present an immi-
nent and substantial danger to the public health211 and that state 
and local governments have not acted to protect the health of those 
persons. 212 The Administrator is authorized to issue such orders as 
are necessary to protect the health of people who are or may be users 
of the system or to commence a civil action for appropriate relief. 213 
,., 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d) (Supp. IV, 1974) defines "underground injection" as " ... the 
subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection." A Congressional committee found that 
that increasingly industry and government were disposing of wastes by injecting them into 
underground wells. UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6481 (1974) . 
• 11 Hearings on H.R. 14899. supra note 56, at 136. 
'"' Hearings on H.R. 14899. supra note 56, at 137. 
'" In states with primary enforcement responsibility the Administrator must wait a mini-
mum of 60 days in non-emergency situations, unless the chief executive officer of the state 
requests EPA enforcement. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
m 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). The House Report specified that the Administrator 
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Section 300(i) should play an important role in insuring that the 
American public is protected from dangerous drinking water. By 
enabling the EPA to take action with regard to contaminants not 
covered by the primary regulations, it provides for necessary 
flexibility. Otherwise the EPA could not act against new contami-
nants until they were included in a primary regulation. In addition, 
in states with primary enforcement responsibility, the section ena-
bles the EPA to take immediate action against contaminants pres-
enting imminent and substantial danger and avoids the delay inher-
ent in an EPA action concerning normal primary regulation viola-
tions.214 Finally, the section not only permits the EPA to step in 
immediately, but it also enables the EPA to issue administrative 
orders and thus avoid the delay required to commence a civil suit. 
One unanswered question exists under this section: what consti-
tutes an imminent and substantial danger to the public health? The 
house report is of some assistance on this point. It states an intent 
that the "language be construed by the courts and the Administra-
tor so as to give paramount importance to the protection of the 
public health."215 In defining "imminent," the report states that the 
Administrator and the courts must act early enough to prevent the 
potential hazard from materializing. It also states that only the risk 
of harm has to be imminent and the harm itself need not be.218 Thus 
imminent danger is presented by contaminants which do not imme-
diately harm the public health but which may do so in the future 
through an accumulative or latent process. In defining "substan-
tial," the report states that it can be a substantial likelihood that a 
contaminant capable of causing adverse health effects will be ing-
ested by consumers, a substantial statistical probability that dis-
ease will result from the contaminant in the water, or the threat of 
substantial or serious harm.217 The report does not specify how large 
a group must be affected before a health hazard is substantial, nor 
does it indicate how serious a disease must be before it is considered 
substantial. 
A sound reason does exist for giving an expansive interpretation 
could order the reporting of information relevant to the emergency, the issuance of notices to 
the public, the treating of hazardous situations, and the provision of alternative sources of 
water. UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6487 (1974). 
21< See text at note 157, supra, for indication of the delay involved. 
215 UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. NEWS 6488 (1974). 
211 Id. at 6488. 
217 Id. at 6488. 
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to "imminent and substantial danger." As was noted above, in 
states with primary enforcement responsibility considerable delay 
precedes authorization of federal enforcement in non-emergency sit-
uations.218 As a result, if a violation of a primary regulation is not 
considered an emergency, the EPA cannot act for 60 days to secure 
compliance, notwithstanding the seriousness of the health hazard. 
If "imminent and substantial danger" were given an expansive 
reading, the EPA would be able to secure immediate compliance in 
a larger number of hazardous circumstances.219 
The SDWA: Sections 300j-1 through 300j-3 
Sections 300j-1, 300j-2, and 300j-3 enable the EPA to provide 
research, technical and financial assistance to state and municipal 
drinking water programs. Pursuant to § 300j-1(a)(1), the EPA has 
the discretion to conduct research in the area of drinking water 
safety. This research can range from developing new methods for 
identifying contaminants in drinking water supplies to developing 
new and improved methods of water purification and distribution. 
Section 300j-1(a)(2) requires the EPA to provide technical assis-
tance to states and municipalities in the establishment and admin-
istration of public water system supervision programs.220 In addi-
tion, §§ 300j-l(a)(3) through 300j-1(a)(9) require the EPA to con-
duct studies into various aspects of drinking water safety. 
Section 300j-1(b) authorizes the EPA to make available the infor-
mation gained from research pertaining to provision of safe supplies 
of drinking water. In addition, it authorizes the EPA to permit 
authorized groups to use EPA research facilities. Finally, it enables 
the EPA to enter contracts with or make grants to agencies or educa-
tional institutions to develop or conduct programs for the training 
of persons working in the public health aspects of drinking water 
safety and to train inspectors and supervisors who will train or su-
pervise other persons working in the public health aspects of drink-
ing water safety. 221 
21< See, supra note 157. 
'" One commentator suggests that a test for the effectiveness of an environmental regula-
tory agency is how swiftly action may be takn in situations presenting serious hazard but 
which are not considered emergencies. Schachter, supra note 179, f!t 626. 
2211 "Public water system supervision programs" will be defined, infra, at note 224. The 
section also specifies that this assistance should be provided to the maximum extent feasible. 
42 U.S.C. § 300j-l(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
221 42 U.S.C. § 300j-1(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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Section 300j-1 is another important aspect of the SDWA program 
to ensure provision of safe drinking water to the American public. 
The Congressional hearings preceding the Act had indicated that 
continuous and expanded research concerning drinking water safety 
is crucial. The point had clearly been made that failure to develop 
sufficient new methods to contend with drinking water hazards had 
led to many of the problems which currently exist. 222 Provisions for 
technical assistance to states are also of great value. As the primary 
regulations require that the water systems provide higher quality 
drinking water, the water systems will undoubtably need assistance 
in determining which treatment methods and facilities are appro-
priate for achieving that level of quality. This section enables the 
EPA to provide that assistance. Finally, by authorizing the EPA to 
develop programs to train people in the public health aspects of 
drinking water safety and in supervision and inspection in that area, 
the section should help to eliminate the shortage of trained person-
nel,223 
Section 300j-2 provides for federal grants to state water supervi-
sion programs,224 if the state meets eligibility criteria specified in the 
section.225 As was noted above, effective state enforcement programs 
are essential to the success of the SDWA.228 By providing finan,cial 
grants to states which have or will attain primary enforcemenfte-
sponsibility, this section gives the states incentive to develop pro-
grams which meet the criteria necessary to achieve that status. This 
should result in more effective state enforcement programs. The 
section makes no provision for grants to aid in the construction of 
new water treatment facilities. 227 The only financial assistance for 
the construction of treatment facilities is found in § 300j-3. 
222 See, supra note 54 . 
... See" text at note 43, supra, for a discussion of the CWSS, and see text at note 57, supra, 
for a discussion of the Congressional hearings. 
224 42 U.S.C. § 300j-2(c)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). Public water system supervision program is 
defined as: ". . . a program for the adoption and enforcement of drinking water regulations 
. . . which are no less stringent than the national primary drinking water regulations . . . 
and for keeping records and making reports .... " 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-2(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). The initial grant is contingent upon the 
Administrator finding that the State has established or will establish within one year from 
the date of such grant a public water system supervision program and will within that year 
assume primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems in the state. In addition, 
a state cannot receive a grant more than one year after the date of the initial grant unless 
the state is maintaining primary enforcement responsibility. 
22' See text at note 72, supra. 
227 See text at notes 91-96, supra, for objections to such provisions voiced at the Congres-
sional hearings. 
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Section 300j-3 provides for two forms of financial assistance to 
water supply systems. The initial form is grants for the development 
and demonstration of new or improved techniques for providing a 
safe supply of drinking water.228 The second form of financial assis-
tance is private loan guarantees to small public water systems.229 
The purpose of these loan guarantees is to enable the systems to 
comply with the primary regulations. 23o 
While providing for a federal financial commitment this section 
leaves the primary financial burden on the states and the public 
water systems. These systems will have to provide the resources to 
finance the construction and improvements necessary to achieve 
compliance with the Act's primary regulations. This approach indi-
cates a Congressional decision that large amounts of federal finan-
cial assistance are either unnecessary or unwarranted, and that the 
combination of variances and exemptions, federal technical assis-
tance, and consumer demands for better water quality will enable 
the public water systems to bear the financial burden incident to 
achieving compliance with the primary regulations. 231 
The SDWA: Section 300j-4 
Section 300j-4 allows the Administrator, in an exercise of discre-
tion, to require water systems to perform monitoring of their facili-
ties and to provide information and reports which the Administrator 
considers necessary.232 The section also authorizes the Administra-
tor to enter facilities and carry out inspections in order to ensure 
compliance with the Act's provisions.233 In states with primary en-
forcement responsibility, the Administrator must give the states 
notice of an intended inspection. The Administrator, in determining 
whether inspection is appropriate, is to consider the state's showing 
that a federal inspection will be detrimental to the state's primary 
enforcement program. The state, however, does not have the power 
to preclude the federal inspection if the EPA should decide it is 
necessary.234 
'2' 42 U.S.C. § 300j-3(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
,,, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-3(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). The section specified that such loans cannot be 
made unless the Administrator finds that the systems cannot secure financial assistance from 
any other source and that any facilities constructed are not likely to be made obsolete by 
subsequent changes in primary regulations. 
~10 42 U.S.C. § 300j-3(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'31 See text at notes 89-96, supra, for the conflicting views on this subject. 
~12 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
233 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
~,. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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To exercise its enforcement authority the EPA certainly requires 
the means of ascertaining whether systems are complying with the 
primary regulations. Enabling EPA to require monitoring of and 
reporting from local systems can be an effective means of securing 
that information. The EPA's discretion to require monitoring and 
reporting must be used wisely, however. The EPA should not re-
quire the local public water systems to spend large amounts of time 
and money monitoring and reporting information which will not be 
utilized by the EPA.235 The section's provisions for EPA inspection 
are another effective means to acquire information as to whether 
systems are complying with the Act. This authority is essential to 
EPA enforcement in states without primary enforcement responsi-
bility as well as the EPA oversight in states with primary enforce-
ment responsibility. Equally essential to effective EPA oversight is 
the section's provision which does not allow a state with primary 
enforcement responsibility to prevent EPA inspection within that 
state. 
The SDWA: Sections 300j-7 and 300j-B 
Section 300j-7 provides for judicial review of EPA and state de-
terminations or actions made pursuant to the Act. 238 Section 300j-
7(a)(1) permits judicial review of EPA action in promulgating the 
primary regulations, regulations concerning state application for 
primary enforcement responsibility, regulations for public notice to 
be given by operators of non-complying systems, and regulations for 
state underground injection control programs. Jurisdiction for re-
view of these actions is vested only in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Section 300j-7(a)(2) permits 
judicial review of other regulations, orders, or determinations made 
by the EPA pursuant to the Act. Jurisdiction over these actions is 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. 
Section 300j-7(b) provides for judicial review of decisions to grant 
or deny variances and exemptions pursuant to §§ 300g-4 and 300g-
5. Jurisdiction for these actions is in the United States District 
Courts. 
23. See, The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974: A Management Impact Statement, THE 
AMERICAN CITY (1975). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-5 (Supp. IV, 1974) establishes a National Drinking Water Advisory 
Council; 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6 (Supp. IV, 1974) requires federal agencies to comply with the 
primary regulations and underground injection control programs. 
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Section 300j-B provides for "citizen suits" by giving "any person" 
standing to commence a civil action against any party alleged to be 
in violation of a requirement prescribed by the Act.237 It also gives 
"any person" standing to commence a civil action against the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA where he has failed to perform a non-
discretionary duty prescribed by the Act. 238 In conjunction with the 
requirement that public notice be given where a system fails to 
comply with the primary regulations, "citizen suits" pursuant to § 
300j-B should provide backup enforcement of the regulations where 
the states or the EPA have failed to take the necessary action. 
Enabling citizens to bring an action against the EPA for failure to 
perform non-discretionary duties should also add to the bureau-
cratic accountability established under § 300j-7. Section 300j-B, 
however, does present a policy issue. Under the section, citizens 
cannot commence a civil action conerning a violation of a require-
ment prescribed by the Act until 60 days after notifying the Admin-
istrator, the violator, and the state involved, of the violation.239If the 
violation were to involve a contaminant which did not pose a serious 
hazard to the public health, 60 days would be of little consequence. 
If the contaminant were to pose an immediate hazard to the public 
health, however, the 60 day wait could have grave consequences. 
Thus, permitting the 60 day wait to be waived on a showing that 
the violation of a requirement presents an immediate hazard to the 
public health would be appropriate. 
The SDWA: Section 300)-9 
Section 300j-9, the final section of the Act, contains various 
general provisions. These provisions, inter alia, authorize the Ad-
2:11 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
23< 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). To secure standing, recent Supreme Court 
decisions have required a plaintiff to establish that he has incurred "injury in fact" and that 
the interest he sought to protect is arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected or 
regulated by the statute in question. Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). While not excusing a plaintiff from 
establishing that he has incurred "injury in fact," the § 300j-8 specification that "any person" 
can bring a civil action excuses the plaintiff from establishing that his interest arguably falls 
within the "zone of interest" to be protected by the statute. By using such language, Congress 
has declared that "any person" falls within the zone of interests to be protected by the 
SDWA. 
239 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). The section also precludes citizen action 
where the Administrator, th Attorney General, or the State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil action. The section allows the citizen, however, to intervene as a matter 
of right. 
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ministrator to prescribe regulations that are necessary and appro-
priate to carry out functions performed under the Act and establish 
the Administrator's responsibility to submit a report to Congress 
concerning activities taken pursuant to the Act. 
A noteworthy provision of § 300j-9 concerns the protection given 
to employees of public w~ter systems. Employers are prohibited 
from discharging or otherwise discriminating against water system 
employees who either commence a suit for enforcement of a primary 
regulation, testify in such a proceeding or in any other fashion assist 
such a proceeding.2~o The Act provides for the Secretary of Labor to 
investigate a claim by an employee that he was discriminated 
against on the basis of any of the above actions. The Secretary of 
Labor is authorized to issue orders requiring reinstatement of the 
employee and payment of backpay.241 By encouraging employees to 
report primary regulation violations by their employers, the provi-
sion should create greater water system accountability. The likeli-
hood is small, however, that a significant number of employees will 
proceed or testify against their employers, and consequently place 
their jobs in jeopardy, notwithstanding the avowed protection.242 
CONCLUSION 
The SDWA represents an accumulation of and compromise be-
tween the many opposing positions which were represented at the 
Congressional hearings. Because consensus was not reached as to 
which approach would be most successful in achieving the Act's 
objective, the Congressional response was to assemble a program 
including features from all of the proposed programs. 
Certain provisions of the Act are likely to prove critical to achieve-
ment of the Act's objectives. The EPA must carefully administer 
the development and subsequent revision of the primary regula-
tions. These standards will play the essential role of providing a 
measuring stick to determine whether a public water system is pro-
viding safe water to its consumers. The provisions for public notifi-
cation of systems failing to comply with primary regulations are also 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" Representative Symington did note, however, that: 
[Slimilar provisions which now exist elsewhere are indeed being used. Under the Water 
Pollution Act provision, some 17 cases are now being actively processed. Under the OSHA 
provision, the Solicitor's office has given the go-ahead to process 24 cases. 
120 CONGo REc. 10813 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974). 
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of great significance. They should facilitate a public demand for safe 
drinking water which will cause drinking water safety to be given 
higher priority when budgetary decisions must be made, as well as 
give the states incentive to more effectively administer their drink-
ing water safety programs. The final provision having special signifi-
cance is EPA oversight of state water supervision programs where 
the state has primary enforcement responsibility. The states will 
provide the major part of the leg-work necessary to secure compli-
ance with the primary regulations. The EPA, however, must care-
fully oversee the state programs and step in and notify states when 
they are not effectively securing compliance with the regulations. 
This approach will not only provide a safety mechanism to ensure 
compliance, but will also provide incentive to those states honestly 
desiring to independently administer the drinking water program in 
their jurisdiction. Effective administration of the Act's provisions, 
giving special consideration to the aspects noted above, together 
with various changes which have been suggested throughout this 
article, should make the SDW A a successful step toward ensuring 
the provision of safe water to the American consumer. 
